Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff

President Dilma Rousseff speaking before the Brazilian Congress in February 2016.
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The impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff, the 36th President of Brazil, began in late 2015 and continued through 2016. An impeachment request against Rousseff was accepted by Eduardo Cunha, then president of the Chamber of Deputies, on 2 December 2015. Rousseff was charged with criminal responsibility in the execution of her duties, including administrative misconduct and disregarding the federal budget in violation of article 85, items V and VI[1] of the Brazilian Constitution and the Fiscal Responsibility Law, article 36.[2] However, a large number of scholars and witnesses during the hearing phase of the process stated that these lapses did not amount to criminal responsibility. In the course of the process, two of the six supplemental budget decrees signed by Rousseff without approval from Congress were considered neutral from a fiscal perspective and were removed from the charges.

According to the impeachment request,[3] Rousseff was also accused of omission concerning irregularities in Brazilian petroleum company Petrobras where she, as President of Brazil and presented with serious allegations uncovered by Operation Car Wash, failed to distance herself from the suspects. According to the report, that omission was aggravated by Rousseff's being president of the board of directors of the company during the time that the investigated facts occurred, including the controversial acquisition of Pasadena Refining System, cited on page 3 of the impeachment request.[3] According to this request, her omission would indicate criminal responsibility.[4] However, these charges of omission were not included in the impeachment process, since any indictment on her involvement in the suspicious purchase of Pasadena was set aside by a legal obstacle that prevented investigating a president for acts previous to his/her presidential mandate.[5][6]

On 31 August 2016, the Senate removed President Rousseff from office by a vote of 61–20, finding her guilty of breaking budgetary laws.[7]

Background

Tax evasion and wrongdoing at Petrobras, "fiscal pedalling"

Main article: Petrobras scandal

Alleged graft occurred while President Rousseff was still part of the board of directors of state-owned energy company Petrobras from 2003 to 2010. One million Brazilians protested in the streets calling for Rousseff's impeachment.[8] No evidence that Rousseff herself was involved in the scheme was found and she denied any prior knowledge of the graft.[9] Further investigation found that there were various offshore accounts and collections of art that were held by those involved in the controversy.[10]

In February 2014, an investigation by Brazilian Federal Police called "Operation Car Wash" placed Petrobras at the center of "what may be the largest corruption scandal in Brazil's history".[11][12] On 14 November 2014, police raids across six Brazilian states netted prominent Brazilian politicians and businessmen—including some Petrobras directors—who were placed under investigation in regards to "suspicious" contracts worth $22 billion.[11][12]

Under Rousseff, the government of Brazil has also been accused of carrying out "fiscal pedalling"—an accounting manoeuvre through which the government gives the false impression that it received more money than was spent.[13][14][15] The government failed to provide funds to public and private banks that make payments for a number of public expense programs, including social assistance programs like Bolsa Família,[16] forcing the banks to finance programs without receiving government compensation.[17] The government's apparent motive was to improve its fiscal outcomes for the years 2012 to 2014.[18] The Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), in a unanimous decision, considered this operation a violation of fiscal responsibility.[18][19][20] TCU is an auxiliary of the legislative body and has no legal power; however, their decision put the National Congress under pressure to begin the process of impeachment against President Rousseff.[21][22]

Political context

Dilma Rousseff speaking at her presidential inauguration in a joint session of the National Congress, 1 January 2015. Behind her are the president of the Senate, Renan Calheiros, and the Vice President, Michel Temer.

Rousseff was reelected in the 2014 general election, winning 51.64% of the votes. The election was one of the most contentious presidential elections in the country's history.[23] After being sworn in on 1 January 2015,[24] she started her second term weakened, mainly due to the national recession that started in 2014 and allegations of corruption, which led to a 68% disapproval rating in a survey by Ibope on second half of June 2015, the highest disapproval rating ever for a president of Brazil, since its redemocratization.[25][26] On 15 March 2015, several protests began, gathering hundreds of thousands of Brazilians across the country to demand the impeachment or the resignation of Rousseff, among other issues.[27]

Beyond the violations of the budget law, Rousseff and her government were increasingly tainted by corruption allegations. The President of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha, was investigated in Operation Car Wash under allegations of receiving bribes and keeping secret Swiss bank accounts. Consequently, the Ethics Council of the Chamber moved a lawsuit against him, putting Cunha in danger of losing his mandate. Rumours emerged about attempts at reaching an agreement between the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Workers' Party (PT) in order to end this process, which Cunha strongly denied. When the Workers' Party announced its support for the wedge term loss on the Board of Ethics, he accepted the request for impeachment as an instrument of blackmail.[28]

In his defense, Cunha said: "The receipt of the complaint has clearly defined reasons when it talks about direct participation in the conduct that was described in what were then budget decrees. I haven't issued and I will not issue any judgment on the accusation against the President of the Republic, even more if it's a personal matter. I'm just sticking to facts exemplified (in the law)". He also stressed that Rousseff signed six decrees with additional credits, which increased the 2015 federal spending in non-compliance with the annual budget law and without approval of the Congress.[28]

Inconsistent and unfounded are the reasons for this request. There is no illegal act committed by me [...] I would never accept any kind of bargain, much less those that threaten the free functioning of democratic institutions in this country.
Dilma Rousseff, News conference and pronouncement on national television – 2 December 2015.[29][30][31]

In turn, Rousseff denied any attempt to forge a deal to save Cunha and get rid of impeachment, as well as agreements to interfere with the Ethics Board in exchange for the approval of a CPMF (Provisional Contribution on the Movement or Transmission of Values and Credits and Financial Nature Rights), which was another great need of the government. At a news conference on 2 December, she said that she would never accept or agree to any kind of bargain.[29]

She lied on national television network and this is very serious. If she had not participated directly I would not speak.
Eduardo Cunha, News conference – 3 December 2015.[28]

After this pronouncement of the president, Cunha said Rousseff lied to the nation when she said she would not participate in any bargain and that the government had much to explain to the country. Cunha claimed he was not aware of negotiations and that he had not met Jaques Wagner (the supposed intermediary in negotiations with Rousseff). Declaring himself against the Workers' Party, he said he would rather not have the three votes from the party in the Council of Ethics.[32]

Comments by specialists and public opinion

Political scientists heard by Agência Brasil in December 2015 commented on the political crisis, mainly describing Rousseff's inability to negotiate with Congress, in addition to comments on Brazil's political system, which allows fragmentation through the great number of political parties in Brazil, all causing an ungovernable government. Moreover, the comments said, the opposition has been confronting Rousseff's presidency in the aftermath of the elections of 2014, refuting the electoral results and calling for a recount of votes. Her campaign accounts were also disputed, along with impeachment threats destabilizing the government. However, some of the comments said, the outbreak of the process could be beneficial for Rousseff, who would then be freed from blackmail and could potentially reorganize her government. Political scientists believed Cunha could lose his mandate and that the opposition would try to push the process in Congress for 2016 in order to mitigate the "electoral ecstasy" and "act of revenge" that were said to be the hosts of the impeachment application.[33]

In CNT/MDA polls performed in March 2015, only 10.8% of Brazilians approved of Rouseff's government and 59.7% wanted her impeached. In July 2015, this number had risen to 62.8%.[34] By April 2016, in polls performed by Datafolha Institute, 61% of Brazilians believed that Rousseff should be impeached.[35]

Request for impeachment

Since 2012, a total of 37 requests for impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff have been presented to the Chamber of Deputies. However, only one request was accepted by then president of the Chamber Eduardo Cunha.[3] The accepted request for impeachment was submitted by former congressman and attorney Hélio Bicudo and attorneys Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaina Paschoal.[36] The request was based on allegations of omission concerning irregularities in Petrobras, fiscal responsibility crimes, and budgetary mismanagement.

Omission

In the course of Operation Car Wash, many illegal and suspicious operations were investigated, including the purchase of the Pasadena Refinery by Petrobras, a business that has proved extremely unfavourable to Brazil, according to the impeachment request. The financial losses were higher than R$700 million (US$320 million). Roussef was president of the Board of Directors of Petrobras and gave as excuse, a mistake concerning a contractual clause. According to the report, the President insisted in thesis that the allegations would be a kind of coup, mere attempt to weaken Petrobras, always emphasizing its expertise in economy and energy sector, namely, the President insisted on the company's financial health. She stepped down in Petrobras only in February 2015, when the situation was already untenable.[37][38][39]

The report also denounces a corrupt scheme involving shady deals of former President Lula, who intermediated business of the Brazilian construction company Norberto Odebrecht in Cuba and Angola, which Rousseff had knowledge that were for the purpose of money laundering of corruption at Petrobras. Some international companies were chosen to be encouraged and, thereafter, participating in unrealistic bids, drain the state-owned company, giving back much of the values through seemingly licit donations. In statements taken from accused in Operation Car Wash, was found that Lula and Dilma knew of the bribery scheme in Petrobras.[40]

Fiscal responsibility crimes

Rousseff has edit in the years 2014 and 2015, six unnumbered decrees that resulted in the provision of additional credits to social programs with electoral purposes, without authorization from Congress. These values were in the amount of R$18.5 billion (US$6.9 billion) and were contracted in official financial institutions without the necessary legislative authorization, even with the targets set not being complied in the Fiscal Responsibility Law and the Annual Budgetary Law. To obtain these additional credits, the target of 2014 was reduced by the end of 2014 by R$67 billion (US$25 billion), at the request of the president. The same conduct of the accused was committed in 2015. Rousseff, by means of decrees, authorized in the years 2014 and 2015, the opening credit, disregarding the Annual Budgetary Law and the Federal Constitution, precisely to allow the provision of additional resources when it was known that the primary superavit target in the Budget forecast was not being fulfilled, and would not be fulfilled.[41]

Illegal practices of accounting disinformation and so-called "fiscal pedalling"

In 2011 and 2014, the Union has held illegal credit operations from no transfer of funds to the national financial system entities controlled by the State. That practice was taken from financial advances made by official financial institutions, such as Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil for finance social programs of responsibility of the Federal Government. These transactions were reported in 2015 by Tribunal de Contas da União and, according to the report, aimed at election results.[42]

The Union contracted Caixa Economica Federal and Banco do Brasil as operators by Federal Government social programs. For this purpose, the Union should pass along directly from the National Treasury Secretary account, the necessary resources for the realization of programs each month, more precisely, would be obliged to transfer to the financial institutions the equivalent values for the equalization of interest rates, expenditures and legal transfers. But the government had not done these refunds and the contracted financial system entities made payments to programs beneficiaries with own resources and hence promoted the credit constitution in his favor against the Union. This procedure is a form of mutual credit, or similar operation and in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Law, art. 36, is prohibited to carry out credit operations between a state financial institution and the member of the Federation that controls it, as the borrower. The total balance of these liabilities by the end of August 2014 was R$1.74 billion (US$740 million). Of an amount of R$7.8 billion (US$2.9 billion) spent on subsidies in the programs between 2009 and 2014, only R$1.6 billion (US$590 million) was transferred by the Union.[43]

By the end of 2014, Rousseff sent to the National Congress the PLN Nr. 362014, to change the Budgetary Directives Law aimed at modifying the rules of the primary superavit. Thus, has demonstrated knowledge of the results of the public accounts and which has taken the necessary steps to regularize them. However, he did just to meet your interest, as sought avoid being accused of a crime committed for not meet the fiscal targets set out in law.[44]

Both the Federal Constitution and Article 4 of Law 1079/50, establish that give rise the impediment of the President the fact that attempt against probity in administration and against the budget law. Are crimes of responsibility against the budget law, order or authorize the opening of credit in disagreement with the limits set by the Senate, not well-founded in budget law or in additional credit law or inobservance of legal prescription;(Law Nr. 10028, 2000) and fail to promote or to order the full settlement of credit operations in anticipation of budget revenue, including related interest and other charges, until the end of the fiscal period; (Law Nr. 10028, 2000).[45]

Therefore, there is a political violation, which may lead to the impeachment, by Legislative trial, and there is a civil offense, which entails indemnities and mandate cassation by the Judiciary. When the author of conduct is the President, also commit crime of responsibility, pursuant to art. 10 of Law n. 1079/50, amended by Law Nr. 10028/2000.[46]

Process in Congress

Acceptance of the request for impeachment

Eduardo Cunha states that the Chamber of Deputies agreed to open the proceedings, on 2 December 2015.

There were 37 requests for impeachment filed with the Chamber of Deputies by September 2015, against Dilma Rousseff, but the president's home only received the written request of Hélio Bicudo and the lawyers Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaina Paschoal.[3][47][48] The social movement pro-impeachment (such as the Free Brazil Movement and Come to the Street Movement) decided to join Bicudo's request.[49] It also had the support of parliamentarians and civil society, which organized a petition in support of the impeachment of the President of the Republic.[50]

Lawyers, in the document presented to the House, tried to associate Dilma Rousseff with Operation Car Wash, cited failure in case of corruption, investigated influence peddling against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and "fiscal pedalling".[51][52] In addition, it contributed to support the request of six decrees signed by the president in the fiscal year of 2015 in disagreement with the law guidelining the budget, which were published without permission of the Congress.[53]

Voting the request admissibility in Chamber of Deputies

After the acceptance of the request, a special committee was formed in the Chamber of Deputies to decide on its admissibility. It began with the testimony of the authors of the request, followed by a presentation of Rousseff's defense. Meanwhile, street protests for and against the impeachment occurred periodically throughout the country.[54][55] The committee's report was favorable to impeaching the President: 38 deputies approved the report while 27 did not.[56]

On 17 April 2016, the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Brazilian Parliament) concluded a general vote for the admission of the impeachment process. 367 members voted for impeachment, while 137 voted against, 7 abstained and 2 were absent from the session.[57] The internal rules of the house stated that the process would be admitted only if it received at least 342 votes for, between the 513 sitting members. On the following day, the president of the Chamber, Eduardo Cunha, delivered the process to the Senate, upper legislative house, which follow the procedure and judged the case. On 5 May 2016, Teori Zavascki, judge of Supreme Federal Court decided that Eduardo Cunha must step down from the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and suspend his mandate, because he is facing a corruption trial. The decision was later endorsed by all eleven judges of Court and had not affected the process of impeachment against Dilma Rousseff.[58]

Voting the opening of impeachment process in the Chamber of Deputies on 17 April 2016[59]
Party Abbr. For Against Abstain Absent Total
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party PMDB 59 7 1 67
Brazilian Labour Party PTB 14 6 20
Brazilian Republican Party PRB 22 22
Brazilian Social Democracy Party PSDB 52 52
Brazilian Socialist Party PSB 29 3 32
Communist Party of Brazil PCdoB 10 10
Democratic Labour Party PDT 6 12 1 19
Democrats DEM 28 28
Green Party PV 6 6
Humanist Party of Solidarity PHS 6 1 7
Labour Party of Brazil PTdoB 2 1 3
National Ecologic Party PEN 1 1 2
National Labour Party PTN 8 4 12
Party of the Brazilian Woman PMB 1 1
Party of the Republic PR 26 10 3 1 40
Popular Socialist Party PPS 8 8
Progressive Party PP 38 4 3 45
Republican Party of the Social Order PROS 4 2 6
Social Christian Party PSC 10 10
Social Democratic Party PSD 29 8 37
Social Liberal Party PSL 2 2
Socialism and Liberty Party PSOL 6 6
Solidarity SD 14 14
Sustainability Network REDE 2 2 4
Workers' Party PT 60 60
Total 367 137 7 2 513

Voting the process opening in Senate

Wikinews has related news: Brazilian Senate vote to suspend President Rousseff

After the vote held in the Chamber on 17 April to allow the charges against the President to be presented to the Senate, the process was delivered by Cunha to the Senate and confirmed with a 55–22 vote on 12 May, in a section that lasted more than 20 hours, resulting in the suspension of Rousseff's presidential powers and duties up to 180 days. During this period, while the judgement of the process occurs (which decides whether the president should be convicted and removed from office, or acquitted with powers and duties restored), Rousseff's vice-president Michel Temer will serve as acting president.[60]

Voting the process opening in the Senate on 12 May 2016[61]
Party Abbr. For Against Abstain Absent Vacant Total
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party PMDB 13 2 1 2 18
Brazilian Labour Party PTB 1 2 3
Brazilian Republican Party PRB 1 1
Brazilian Social Democracy Party PSDB 11 11
Brazilian Socialist Party PSB 5 2 7
Christian Labour Party PTC 1 1
Communist Party of Brazil PCdoB 1 1
Democratic Labour Party PDT 2 1 3
Democrats DEM 4 4
Green Party PV 1 1
Independent Ind 1 1 2
Party of the Republic PR 4 4
Popular Socialist Party PPS 1 1
Progressive Party PP 6 6
Social Christian Party PSC 1 1 2
Social Democratic Party PSD 3 1 4
Sustainability Network REDE 1 1
Workers' Party PT 11 11
Total 55 22 1 2 1 81

Acting president

Michel Temer in his first ministerial meeting on 13 May 2016

In the Brazilian political system, the President and Vice President form a single electoral coalition. However, their terms are constitutionally separate. Michel Temer was President of the Chamber of Deputies during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso presidential mandate, from 1995 to 2002.[62] Mr. Temer is a member of PMDB, which declared moving to opposition to Dilma Rousseff government in March 2016.[63] According to some newspapers such as The Guardian, "for those desperate for change, Temer represents salvation. Others, more concerned about the country's fragile democracy, believe he is the perpetrator of a coup."[64] A separate proposal to impeach Michael Temer as Acting President and Vice President has been made.

Public opinion survey and economics

A CNT/MDA poll published on 8 June 2016, indicates that 11.3% of Brazilians approved and 28% censured the acting government of President Temer. For 30.2% of respondents, Temer's government is ordinary, while 30.5% gave no answer. The survey revealed that 46.6% of Brazilians believed that the corruption in Temer's government could be equal to that experienced in Rousseff's government. Also according to the poll, 28.3% believe that corruption could be lessened, while 18.6% estimated that it could be even greater. Regarding lawfulness in the process of impeachment, 61.5% agreed with the conduction of the process, 33.3% answered negatively and 5.2% didn't answer. According to the survey agency, the CNT/MDA polled 2,002 people in 137 municipalities in 25 federative units from 2 to 5 June. The margin of error was 2.2 percentage points, with 95% reliability.[65][66]

An Ipsos poll in early July 2016 concluded that 16% of Brazilians preferred Temer in office, 20% that Rousseff should be acquitted and restored to office to conclude her four-year mandate; 52% that whoever assumes the command of the nation must call new elections for president. However, the anticipated elections can only occur with the approval of a large majority of Congress (three-fifths) or if Temer and Rousseff resign simultaneously, considered unlikely. Alternatively, both could be removed from their offices, depending on the outcome of a lawsuit filed in Superior Electoral Court by the PSDB, party of Aécio Neves, then defeated candidate in the presidential elections of 2014, claiming that there was electoral crime in the political campaign of the alliance Rousseff-Temer, with donations made by companies investigated in Operation Car Wash.[67] In the poll, 12% were undecided or had not answered; sample size was 1,200 people in 72 Brazilian municipalities. The margin of error was 3 percentage points.[68][69]

According to the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), the industry confidence index reached 47.3 points in July 2016, from 45.7 in June, 10.1 points higher than July 2015.[70] In the CNI Industrial Thermometer, released on 2 September 2016, two indicators had positive performance: exports and industrial confidence index. Five others were negative: hours worked in production, employment, sales, investment intention and effective capacity utilization rate. Two indicators were steady: production and actual-planned stock indicator.[71]

According to Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the National Index of Consumer Prices Broad in Brazil decreased from 0.78% in May 2016 to 0.35% in June 2016, the lowest index since August 2015.[72]

Impeachment trial

Completed the phases of appreciation and admissibility of the impeachment process, the subsequent procedure requires new citations, instruction with gathering of evidences and witness testimonies to support the decision. The Senate, in a plenary session, pronounce by a simple majority if the charges are well-founded or not to the decisive judgement. The first task is Rousseff notification to allow a new defence. For this whole second phase of the process, the Committee is supported by the president of Supreme Federal Court, Ricardo Lewandowski. The last phase of the trial, that decided by the conviction or acquittal of the withdrawn President, is chaired by Lewandowski, on the condition of Supreme Court president. On this decisive voting, two-thirds of the votes (54 of the total of 81 senators) are needed to permanently remove the President.[73][74]

Rousseff's defence

The 20-day period in which suspended President Dilma Rousseff could present a preliminary written defence for the trial in the Senate expired on 1 June 2016.[75] On that day, the document was personally registered in the Senate by Rousseff's lawyer, former Minister of Justice and former General's Office attorney José Eduardo Cardozo.[76]

José Eduardo Cardozo

In the 370-page document, besides the reasons already claimed on the previous phase, that the president had not committed the alleged crimes of responsibility, it was stated that the "just cause or reason aimed at the need for consummation of Rousseff's impeachment was only and exclusively the aim at end up the Operation Car Wash". For this statement, Cardozo was supported by the transcripts of a recorded telephone conversation between Sérgio Machado (politician and businessman), former president of Transpetro (a Petrobras subsidiary), and the senator Romero Jucá. Jucá, a politician with influential leadership in the Brazilian party PMDB, has been appointed Planning Minister by the acting President Temer. The recorded conversation, published by the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, convinced Cardozo that they were trying to prevent the investigation widening, due to the risk of both being caught up, and suggested that Rousseff's impeachment could have been part of an agreement aimed at preventing (and possibly later stopping) the Operation Car Wash investigations. Otherwise, the lawyer of senator Jucá said that his client never thought to interfere in Operation Car Wash and the dialogue did not suggest that.[77][78] Jucá himself also denied ever attempting to obstruct the investigation, and after speaking with Temer on 23 May, said that he had no intention of resigning,[79] however, on next day, Jucá resigned after eleven days in office.[80]

Committee meetings

Work plan and preliminar requests

On 25 May 2016, the senator Antonio Anastasia, rapporteur of the Special Committee of Impeachment 2016 (CEI 2016),[81] presented the work plan for the trial. Workers Party senators complained about the haste to adjudicate. The Committee's president Raimundo Lira accepted the request and the next meeting was scheduled to 2 June, for analysis of new deadlines.[73]

The Committee, on 2 June 2016, has appreciated the report with new work plan deadlines presented by the rapporteur Anastasia and requests by senators.[82] The session, that lasted over nine hours, was attended by Roussef's lawyer, José Eduardo Cardozo. Anastasia has proposed by 7 July the final arguments of the prosecution and the defence. Once, the Worker Party senators disagreed with deadlines and decided that they would presented a new revision of the deadlines for analisys of the president of Court, Ricardo Levandowsy. Anastasia also rejected to append in process, the recording of the conversation among Sérgio Machado and the senator Romero Jucá, required by Cardozo. In his understanding, it would be irrelevant to the process, since that the charges against Roussef were fiscal responsibility crimes and the recording was only an informal conversation and nothing could proved legally. Cardozo protested against the decision, claiming that the facts cited in the record were a main object of the investigation. The report was voted and approved just at 20h40. Earlier, the Workers Party senators and the attorney Cardozo withdrew from the meeting, after accusing the Committee's president Lira to lessen the rights of defence.[83] Cardozo has announced on 3 June, that would submit appeals of that decisions to president of Supeme Court, Lewandowski.[84][85]

The Committee approved the work plan and deadlines presented by the rapporteur Anastasia on 6 June.[86]

On 7 June, Lewandowski denied the appeal filed by Cardozo to append the recording of Sérgio Machado, supported by a previous manifestation of the Court, that evidences collected in this kind of testimony are sheltered by confidentiality until the beginning of a formal investigation. Sérgio Machado was arrested and introduced the recording of the conversation during his interrogatory. Besides, the subject under appeal had been discussed in prior decisions of the Court.[87] Lewandowski also denied another appeal of senator Aloysio Nunes, former member of the Committee, to reduce the number of witnesses. On 2 June meeting, the Committee established that would be heard eight witnesses for each fact aimed against Rousseff, both for the prosecution and for the defence, i.e. a total of 48 witnesses for each side, with each supplemental budget decree that motivated the request for impeachment, considered separately. Lewandowski held that the Commission's decision should respect the right to legal defence. Nunes intended that the six decrees were as a unique fact, to be added to the so-called "tax pedalling", which should considered another fact, so that the number of witnesses to be heard could be reduced to 16.[88]

Janaína Conceição Paschoal

Thereafter, on 8 June meeting, the Committee accepted a request of both, defence and prosecution, reducing to four the number of supplemental budget decrees to be considered in the trial, as crime of responsibility by President Rousseff. Thus, the number of witnesses in the process was also reduced to forty. Since each charge entitle eight witnesses, the defence of Rousseff could introduce up to 32 witnesses for the four decrees and eight for the "tax pedalling" charge. The prosecution would be entitled the same number of witnesses. The decision to reduce the charges was supported on a report produced at the course on the House of Representatives, that considered two decrees signed by Rousseff without approval of Congress were neutral from fiscal perspective, once the primary sources and financial expenses listed in these documents were equivalent.[89]

Witnesses hearings

The hearings began on 8 June, with the witnesses convened by prosecution. Rousseff's lawyer Jose Eduardo Cardozo and prosecutors Janaína Paschoal and Miguel Reale Junior also attended the meeting. Four witnesses, indicated by the authors of the impeachment request, were heard in the meeting, that lasted over 14 hours, from 11h40 to 2h10 on 9 June: the procurator of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), Julio Marcelo de Oliveira, the auditor of TCU, Antonio Carlos Costa D'avila Carvalho, the Credit Operations manager of the National Treasury Secretary, Adriano Pereira de Paula, and the deputy secretary of the National Treasury, Otavio Ladeira de Medeiros.

Fraud is the will of, free and consciously, to practice the misconduct and get the result. And that's what the President did. She edited the decrees by a free and conscious mode to increase costs, that could not increased by a decree. She should send a bill.
Julio Marcelo de Oliveira, procurator of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), Agência Brasil.[90]

Julio Marcelo de Oliveira said that in April 2015, TCU has identified the recidivist fiscal misconduct, so-called "tax pedalling", immediately rejected. There was not previous understanding to modified the rules and the consensus, every time that the TCU has ruled, was disapproved this conduct adopted illegally by Rousseff.[90] He also reiterated that the President acted intentionally to borrow from public banks, that acted "coercively" in these operations. This, in his opinion, is serious, and forbidden by the Fiscal Responsibility Law. The practice, he said, lasted years, including throughout the year 2015.[91]

The auditor of TCU, Antonio Carlos Costa D'avila Carvalho said that the fiscal practices by Rousseff were unprecedented. He also reiterated that the misconducts committed has caused serious outcomes.[92]

On 9 and 10 June there were no Committee meetings. From 13 to 17 June, there were five meetings, with hearings of sixteen witnesses, two by prosecution and fourteen by defence.

The prosecution witnesses Tiago Alves de Gouveia Lins Dutra and Leonardo Rodrigues Albernaz, both TCU auditors, were heard on 13 June. Tiago Dutra said that Rousseff held credit operations with public banks in 2015 that had already observed in 2014. A TCU report pointed a delay of eleven months in the amount of R$2.6 billion, and five months in transfers of R$3 billion, related to the operations. For principal and interest, until December 2015, the government have been paid R$15 billion, of which R$2 billion were related to interest.[93] According to Leonardo Albernaz, more than fifty auditors accomplished an analysis of Rousseff accounts and concluded unanimously that her administration has made "the most reckless management" of public finances since the Fiscal Responsibility Law was enacted in May 2000.[94]

The Committee's President, Raimundo Lira, announced the decision of the President of the Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandowski, authorizing an audit in the documents, requested by the defence. Lira designated a board consisting of three experts, granting to prosecution, defence and the Senators 48 hours to formulate questions and indicate technical assistants, as well as 24 hours to refute the appointed experts, fixing also a ten days deadline for the completion of audit.[95]

I don't understand that it was a credit operation, but a rendering of services. At no time that the Union pays to bank was directly related to what the producers has received. The producers received from the bank itself. The Union participation doesn't characterize a credit operation between the Union and public banks.
Gilson Bittencourt, former National Secretary of Planning and Strategic Investment, Agência Brasil.[96]

On 14 June, were heard the first witnesses convened by defence, the former National Secretary of Planning and Strategic Investment, Gilson Bittencourt, and the former Secretary of Agricultural Policy of the Ministry of Agriculture, André Nassar. Bittencourt said that there was no credit operation between the Union and public banks and also denied that there was delay in the payment of interest to public banks in 2015. According to Bittencourt, the debit to be paid in 2016 came to be due only at the time of collection by the banks, that is done every six months.[96] André Nassar said that the Bank of Brazil had interest in "to circulate money", by lend to producers, even getting the transfers delayed by the government. He also said that, as Secretary of Agricultural Policy and from the point of view of the agricultural sector, this was the most important to avoid a discontinuity that, if had occurred, would generated serious outcomes to the sector.[97]

Were heard on 15 June, three witnesses convened by defence, the former Deputy Secretary of the Federal Budget Office, Cilair Rodrigues de Abreu, the former Secretary of Budget and Administration of the Ministry of Social Security, José Geraldo França Diniz and the Juridical Consultant of the Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management, Walter Baere de Araújo Filho. Cilair Rodrigues said that the understanding of the TCU before 2015 was ever that the future target could be used by Secretary of Budget in the publication of their reports. This understanding has changed, he said, only in 2015.[98] França Diniz commented that, due the process complexity for supplemental budget decrees, the documents are reviewed by experts and the President could not accomplish a whole analysis of the documents. Rousseff signed, but it would impossible to analyse in details 200 pages of attachments, calculations and spreadsheets. Walter Baere said that the TCU never emitted formal advices concerning the illegality of the issue of supplemental budget decrees by the President. He said also that the TCU has the specific legal duty to alert when there is a possibility of not achieving the fiscal targets.[99]

Four witnesses convened by defence were heard on 16 June, the former Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Education, Luiz Cláudio Costa, the former Secretary Executive Assistant of the Ministry of Education, Wagner Vilas Boas, the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Education, Iara Ferreira Pinho and the Director of the Department of Economic Programs of the Secretary of Federal Budget, Clayton Luiz Montes. According to Luiz Claudio Costa, the supplemental budget decree for the Ministry of Education,[100] was important for the management, enabling several sectors linked to the Ministry, such as universities, institutes and others, should adequate their budget to the instant needs.[101] Vilas Boas explained that it was not granting of the Ministry of Education to evaluate the impact of the credit opening for obtaining the primary balance target. He said that the sectorial authority – in this case the agencies of the Ministry – make a request for supplemental budget, but are liable to policy guidance and technical supervision by the budget agency. Both, Wagner Vilas Boas and Iara Pinho, said they could not give an opinion on the compatibility of the signed supplementary decrees and the current fiscal target since their functions don't allow to accomplish analysis of the achievement of the target. Concerning these statements, the prosecution pointed out that the technicians were not able to explain specifically about the possible crime of responsibility. "The witnesses left shown that unaware the facts. Our claim is that the evidence shall excused", said prosecution lawyer, Janaina Paschoal, after the testimony of Iara Pinho.[102][103]

Clayton Luiz Montes said that "the government has followed the new understanding of the TCU by October 2015. Since that time, were not sent any credit decrees".[104] This, nevertheless, is conflicting with the statements of TCU auditors, that there was not previous understanding to modified the rules.[90]

On 17 June, were heard five witnesses convened by defence, the former Minister of Planning, Budget and Management, Nelson Barbosa, the former Minister of Education, José Henrique Paim, the Director of the Department of Infrastructure Programs of the Federal Budget Secretary, Zarak de Oliveira Ferreira, the Analyst of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, Antonio José Chatack Carmelo, and the Planning and Budget Analyst of the Federal Budget Office, Georgimar Martiniano de Sousa.

Nelson Barbosa said that the additional credit decrees issued by President Rousseff from June to August 2015 not prevented the fulfilment of the fiscal target approved by Congress in early 2015 and, since is an supplemental credit that has no impact on the target, was not considered a target of primary balance, but to give more autonomy to the allocation of a value already available.[105] Henrique Paim said that the decrees were essential to the functioning of various sectors of Education, including scientific research and operation of universities. Moreover, according to the former minister, the additional credits are often edited based on revenue generation, provided by "budget units", linked to the Ministry.[106] Also the technicians Zarak de Oliveira, Chatack Carmelo and Georgimar Martiniano, have not seen incompatibility of supplemental decrees with the fiscal target.[107]

From 20 to 24 June, there were five meetings, with hearings of fifteen witnesses, all convened by defence.

On 20 June, were heard four witnesses, the former Deputy Chief for Legal Affairs of Staff of the Presidency, Ivo da Motta Azevedo Correa, the former Minister of Education, Renato Janine Ribeiro, the Director of the Department of Social Programs of the Secretary of Federal Budget, Felipe Daruich Neto and the former Deputy Executive Secretary of the Staff of the Presidency, Bruno Moretti. Ivo Correa said that an alert of the TCU is not a decision of the Court, therefore, the government relied on previous jurisprudence to edit the decrees. Janine Ribeiro said that not has received any alert of the TCU about irregularities in the supplemental budget decrees when Minister of Education.[108] Daruich Neto saids that, at any time, as occurred any intentional misconduct and is impracticable to the President evaluate all decrees, before sign it.[109]

Four witnesses were heard on 21 June, the former Minister of the Secretary of Human Rights, Pepe Vargas, the former Minister of Planning, Budget and Management and former President of Caixa Econômica Federal, Miriam Belchior, the Planning and Budget Analyst and former Deputy Secretary of Planning and Budget of the Ministry of Justice, Orlando Magalhães da Cunha and the Coordinator of Budget and Finance of the Ministry of Justice, Marcelo Minghelli. The former Minister Pepe Vargas asserted that the supplemental credit to Secretary of Human Rights was derived not just from Treasury resources, but of surplus resources of funds obtained through donations by individuals and corporations.[110] Mirian Belchior said that the supplemental budget decrees, by which Rousseff is indicted were lawful and was impossible increase the resources contingency as made in 2015.[111]

On 22 June, were heard three witnesses, the Planning and Budget Analyst and General Coordinator of Technology and Information of the Federal Budget Office, Robson Azevedo Rung, the Secretary of Institutional Organization of the Ministry of Defence, Luiz Antonio de Souza Cordeiro and the Representative of the Superior Labor Court, Luciano Carlos de Almeida. Azevedo Rung said that the Federal Budget Office received a new interpretation from TCU only in 2015, concerning to procedures that ever were well settled.[112]

Also on this meeting, the Committee approved a new timetable for the trial. On 6 July, testimony of Rousseff, who can be represented by her lawyer, José Eduardo Cardozo. From 7 to 12 July, final arguments of the prosecution and from 13 to 27 July, final arguments of the defence. On 9 August, discussion and voting of the report in plenary and 22 August, the estimated date to decisive judgment.[113][114]

Committee meeting on 23 June 2016

Two witnesses were heard on 23 June, the Deputy Secretary of Planning, Budget and Administration of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Anderson Lozi da Rocha and the former Secretary of Federal Budget, Esther Dweck. Dweck denied that the supplemental budget decrees in 2015 has contributed to the breach of the target for primary surplus for that year.[115]

On 24 June, were heard two witnesses, the former Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Francisco José Pontes Ibiapina and the Director of Special Programs of the Secretary of Federal Budget, Marcos de Oliveira Ferreira. Pontes Ibiapina said that the supplemental budget decrees were published to aid programs as the transfer of resources to States and Municipalities, by the National Employment System and other programs.[116]

From 27 to 29 June happened three meetings, with hearings of nine witnesses, all convened by defence.

Patrus Ananias, former Ministry of Agrarian Development, was heard on 27 June. Ananias said that he unknowledge the "tax pedalling" and the resources were transferred from the Bank of Brazil directly to producers with subsidized interest rates, due to the heed that agriculture deserves.[117]

On 28 June, were heard Maria Fernanda Ramos Coelho, former Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Agrarian Development, Aldo Rebelo, former Ministry of Defence, Luís Inácio Adams, former General's Office attorney and Antônio Carlos Stangherlin Rebelo, technical responsible for analysis of supplemental credits on the National Justice Council. Maria Fernanda said that the delay in the payment of interest rate equalization of the Plan Safra (government's plan to support agriculture) for 2015, did not configure a credit operation, since the non-compliance was not subject to penalty payment in the contract term. According to former Secretary, the values were only monetarily adjusted. The prosecution lawyer Janaína Paschoal rejected the claims of Maria Fernanda and said that the remuneration per interest rate SELIC (a benchmark interest rate of the Brazilian economy) is a proof that there was a credit operation. The prosecution reiterates that this statement confirmed the infringement materiality, she concluded.[118] Aldo Rebelo rejected the accusations that the government spent wantonly in 2015, and that year was characterized by fiscal adjustments and efforts to reduce the public spending.[119]

On 29 June, were heard João Luiz Guadagnin, Director of the Department of Finance and Production Protection of the Ministry of Agrarian Development, Marcel Mascarenhas dos Santos, Prosecutor of the Central Bank, Fernando Rocha, Deputy Head of the Economic Department of the Central Bank, and Paulo José dos Reis Souza, Finance and Control Analyst and Fiscal Policy Secretary on the National Treasury Secretary.[120][121]

The phase of witnesses hearings had concluded on 29 June. A total of 44 witnesses were heard, six convened by prosecution and 38 by defence.

At the end of the witnesses hearings phase, both the prosecution and the defence lawyers said they were confident about their theses. The prosecution lawyer, Janaina Paschoal, criticized the actions of Rousseff's defense due the great number of witnesses convened, with clear dilatory intention, and the most of witnesses unknows accurately the facts. The defence lawyer, José Eduardo Cardozo also expressed confidence, but said that the process has a political nature and this may interfere in the result. He also pointed out that some senators refused to discuss with the witnesses, because they were already a judgment before the completion of work.[121]

Auditors and assistants hearings

A board of experts called by the Committee's President, Raimundo Lira on 13 June meeting, was heard on 5 July. This board accomplished an audit in the documents, requested by the defence, and authorized by the President of the Supreme Court, Ricardo Lewandowski. The board, composed by the auditors João Henrique Pederiva, Prandino Diego Alves and Fernando Alvaro Leão Rincon, submitted the audit report results. According them, the delays in the transfer of payments to the public banks constituted loans. However, they avoided consider whether there was intent of the President and said that this judgment will be up to senators. After, were also heard the assistant by prosecution, Selene Péres Nunes and the assistant by defense, Ricardo Lodi Ribeiro. Selene Nunes pointed out that there was willful misconduct by the President, since the operations were hidden by accounting and, later, the government has issued a provisional measure allowing the payment of debts.[122] The assistant by defense, Ricardo Ribeiro, said that the President has no responsibility for the issue of the supplemental budget decrees because they were submitted to her signature by the technical areas of the ministries and her participation, as demonstrated in the report, was only the signing of these decrees.[123]

Rousseff interrogatory and final arguments

On 6 July, would be carried out a Rousseff's interrogatory, however she declined to attend the Committee and sent a letter, read entirely by Cardozo.[124] Rousseff defended herself, claiming that she was a victim of a conspiracy, repeating the arguments that have been mentioned from the process beginning.[125] The final arguments by prosecution were delivered to Committee on 12 July,[126] and the final arguments by defense were delivered to Committee on 28 July,[127] for preparation of the final report by rapporteur, Antonio Anastasia.[128]

Final report: discussion and approval

Anastasia submitted the final report on 2 August,[129] concluding by Rousseff's culpability.[130] On 3 August, the document was discussed by the Committee. João Correia Serra, prosecution lawyer in lieu, praised Anastasia's report and stressed the known "centralizing temperament" of Rousseff, that reinforces the impossibility of the withdrawn President not being aware or not directly commanded the acts for which she was accused. Otherwise, Cardozo said that he was sure that Anastasia's report does not evinced that Rousseff has committed crimes, and accused the rapporteur, despite his aptitude and usual brilliance, managed his actions within the opinion of his party.[131] On 4 August, the report was voted and approved by 14–5 vote, closing the work of the Committee and following for voting in the Senate floor on 9 August, chaired by Ricardo Lewandowski, Supreme Federal Court president.[132][133]

Voting the final report in Senate

In a long section, started at 9:40 am on 9 August and lasted over sixteen hours, the Senate floor approved on early morning of 10 August, the final report of Anastasia.[134] By 59–21 vote, the indictments against Dilma Rousseff had upheld,[135][136][137] ending the penultimate phase of the process, called pronunciation and determining the final judgment in the Senate, beginning on 25 August. In this judgment, two-thirds of 81 senators are necessary to remove the President from office and make her ineligible for office, for eight years subsequent to 1 January 2019, when her second term would end.[138]

Decisive voting in Senate

The last phase of the trial has three steps:

  1. Witnesses inquiries, first by Lewandowski and after by the senators (eight witnesses, two convened by prosecution and six by defence). At last, the inquiries are made by prosecution and defence lawyers.[139]
  2. Rousseff personally defend herself, is inquired by senators and final arguments by prosecution and defence.[140]
  3. Decisive voting by senators.

Witnesses inquiries

On 25 August, began the witnesses inquiries, in a stirred section, that lasted over fifteen hours. By prosecution, had convened two witnesses, Julio Marcelo de Oliveira, procurator of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), author of the report recommending the rejection of 2014 accounts, and Antonio Carlos Costa D'avila Carvalho Júnior, auditor of TCU. Oliveira was inquired as informant and not witness, as decided by Lewandowski, after Cardozo accused him that made its report based in a biased understanding. Oliveira refused, claiming that only fulfilled a recommendation to adopt a "less tolerant" rule came from TCU. Oliveira reiterated that Rousseff broke budget laws in 2014 and also in 2015. In the condition of informant, Oliveira complaints cannot be considered as evidence for the process, but as technical information. The next prosecution witness inquired, D'Avila Carvalho, reiterates that Rousseff "disguised" the accounting and was responsible for delaying transfers to state banks. Cardozo also tried to desqualify D'Avila as witness, accusing him of biased conduct, because he helped the prosecutor Oliveira to draft the TCU report. Cardozo pleaded that was "a clearly an unethical situation that violates the principle of impartiality." However, Lewandowski denied the request.[141]

Impeachment trial begins on 25 August 2016

The inquiries continued on 26 and 27 August. Six witness were convened by defence: Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo, economist, Geraldo Luiz Mascarenhas Prado, legal advisor, Luiz Cláudio Costa, former Secretary of Ministry of Education, Nelson Barbosa, former Minister of Planning, Budget and Management, Esther Dweck, former Secretary of Federal Budget and Ricardo Ribeiro Lodi, Law professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. Dweck was dispensed by Lewandowski, since there would be a conflict of interest, once she was being contracted for the office of Gleisi Hoffmann, one of the senators opposed to impeachment. Gonzaga Belluzzo and Ribeiro Lodi were heard in the condition of informant.[142]

Belluzo said that interruption of a mandate achieved by universal suffrage is something that should require very special care. It could only be done in extreme situations, and that trial had not facing it.[143]

For Mascarenhas Prado, by signing the decrees, the President acted in reliance on the advice of his subordinates, which attested to the legality of acts.[144] As for Cláudio Costa, the supplementary credit decrees were used in educational programs. Senator Cássio Cunha Lima refused, saying that crime is not the expansion of universities and technical schools, but the lack of Congress authorization for such decrees.[145]

Nelson Barbosa said that decrees provides more leeway to the administration of funds, when the budget is limited, and are edited by experienced officials. Pro-impeachment senators insisted that those actions have aggravated the economic crisis that facing the country. Barbosa said that the crisis was due to various internal and external factors.[146] At last, Ribeiro Lodi stated that the decrees issued by the President in July and August 2015 were not considered violations until then by TCU and at that moment, when the decrees were issued, this understanding did not exist.[147]

Rousseff self-defence, inquiry by senators and final arguments by lawyers

I know I will be judged, but my conscience is clear. I did not commit a crime.
Dilma Rousseff, [148]
Dilma Rousseff defend herself in Senate on 29 August 2016

Rousseff attended the Senate on 29 August, to defend herself. She discoursed for 45 minutes and then proceeded to answer questions from senators for over twelve hours.[149] She explained that has obliged to make difficult choices about the budget, to face up the declining of revenues and a refusal by opposition in Congress to work with her.[148] She compared her situation with other Brazilian presidents pursued by his opponents, including João Goulart, a leftist ousted in a military coup in 1964, historical event that inaugurated a 21 years dictatorship. In her testimony, she also compared the effort to impeach her, with the suffering she endured in her youth, when dictatorship agents arrested her for militancy in a group of urban guerrillas. She was repeatedly tortured while imprisoned in the early 1970s. Rousseff said that the impeachment proceedings reached to a new type of coup, evoking the breakdown of Brazilian democracy in the 1960s. Senator Ana Amélia Lemos, in reply to Rousseff statement, expressed respect for her personal history, however the senators were not there to judge her biography, but the actions taken in her government and insisted that Rousseff had broken the law by budget manipulation to hide the economic problems.[150]

We are not dealing with a little accounting problem; we are dealing with fraud.
Janaína Paschoal, [148]

The trial resumed on 30, shortly after 10 am and lasted about seventeen hours, with the final arguments of the prosecution and defence,[151][152] and then the speeches of the senators. The speeches lasted twelve hours, ending about 02:30 am on 31.[153]

Decisive voting and outcome

The Senate found President Dilma Rousseff guilty of responsibility crimes and administrative misconduct regarding the federal budget and removed her from office after a vote of 61–20 on 31 August 2016.[7] However, in a separate vote, senators voted 42 to 36 not to bar Rousseff from public office for eight years, which allows her to run for office again in the near future.[154][155][156][157]

Lawsuits against the Senate's judgment

Ms. Rousseff's defence, on 1 September 2016, has filed a writ of mandamus at the Supreme Court against the Senate's decision to remove her from office,[158] rejected on 8 September.[159] On 30 September, Ms. Rousseff's defence has filed a last appeal, questioning the impeachment. A 493 pages piece called for the process annulment. "This petition is aimed at invalidating the decision-making legal act of the Senate that led to the conviction, on August 31 this year, for the crime of responsibility of Her Excellency President of the Republic, Dilma Rousseff", cites the text.[160] The appeal, signed by José Eduardo Cardozo, was denied by Supreme Court on 20 October.[161]

On the other hand, the parties PSDB, DEM and PPS also decided to file a mandamus at the Supreme Court, against the decision on the impeachment trial, to vote separately the loss of political rights, allowing the former President to run for public office, opposed to law that defines the crimes of responsibility and regulates the respective trial process (impeachment law),[162] that determines a concommitance of penalties.[163]

After impeachment

Reactions

International reaction

The South American states of Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela reacted to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff by recalling their ambassadors.[164] On the other hand, the government of Argentina stayed neutral on the Brazilian internal affairs, and confirmed the good bilateral relations with the country;[165] the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Argentina "recognizes the institutional process" that took place in Brazil.[166] Representatives from Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela left their seats during Temer's speech at the UN General Assembly on 20 September 2016.[167] Temer defended the impeachment process, and said that it occurred with "absolute respect for the constitutional order".[168]

On 22 August, about a week before the decisive voting, Brazilian Senate submitted a letter to the Organization of American States (OAS), after complaints by the Workers' Party (former President party), that the impeachment process was an "institutional coup". OAS claimed for information about this complaint and Brazilian Senate stated in letter that "the constitutional rules were strictly observed, objections raised, and appeals to the Supreme Court were accepted."[169]

On early September, just after the final voting, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of OAS, has expressed in a press release, concern about the procedure of impeachment.[170]

National reaction

After the decision of the Senate to impeach Dilma Rousseff, protests organized by supporters of the former president took place in several Brazilian cities against the decision and calling for new elections.[171][172][173]

Public opinion survey and economics

In an Ibope survey in September, after about a month of President Temer's administration, 39% of Brazilians rated his administration "bad or terrible", while 14% considered it "great or good". 2,002 people were heard between 20 and 25 September, and the margin of error was two percentage points.[174]

See also

References

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  2. "Lei Complementar nº 101, de 4 de Maio de 2000" (in Portuguese). Presidência da República do Brasil. 4 May 2000. Retrieved 12 August 2016. Art. 36: It is forbidden the credit operation between a State financial institution and the member of the Federation that control it, in quality of the loan beneficiary.
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